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Abstract
A caste system in which females develop into morphologically distinct queens
or workers has evolved independently in ants, wasps and bees. Although such
reproductive division of labour may beneﬁt the colony it is also a source of
conﬂict because individual immature females can beneﬁt from developing into
a queen in order to gain greater direct reproduction. Here we present a formal
inclusive ﬁtness analysis of caste fate conﬂict appropriate for swarm-founding
social Hymenoptera. Three major conclusions are reached: (1) when caste is
self-determined, many females should selﬁshly choose to become queens and
the resulting depletion of the workforce can substantially reduce colony
productivity; (2) greater relatedness among colony members reduces this
excess queen production; (3) if workers can prevent excess queen production
at low cost by controlled feeding, a transition to nutritional caste determin-
ation should occur. These predictions generalize results derived earlier using
an allele-frequency model [Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. (2001) 50: 467] and are
supported by observed levels of queen production in various taxa, especially
stingless bees, where caste can be either individually or nutritionally
controlled.
Introduction
Societies of eusocial Hymenoptera (ants, and many bees
and wasps), are characterized by a high degree of
cooperation (Wilson, 1971; Ho ¨lldobler & Wilson, 1990;
Seeley, 1995). However, the nonclonal structure of their
societies also causes conﬂict. Traditionally, four major
conﬂicts have been studied (Bourke & Franks, 1995;
Crozier & Pamilo, 1996): (1) queen-worker conﬂict over
the sex ratio, (2) conﬂicts over male parentage, (3)
conﬂicts over female parentage (‘nepotism’; Ratnieks &
Reeve, 1992) and (4) conﬂict over reproductive dom-
inance (e.g. in foundress groups). Recently, however, an
additional conﬂict – that over female caste fate – has
attracted considerable attention (Ratnieks, 1989, 2001;
Bourke & Ratnieks, 1999; Reuter & Keller, 2001; Strass-
mann et al., 2002). In social Hymenoptera, immature
females are generally genetically totipotent, and in
species with morphological castes each can be reared
irreversibly into either a queen or a worker (Wilson,
1971). However, according to caste conﬂict theory,
females would often beneﬁt if they could develop as
queens rather than workers, in order to gain greater
direct reproduction (Bourke & Ratnieks, 1999; Ratnieks,
2001). In social Hymenoptera without morphological
castes, where all females are totipotent, conﬂicts over
who takes on the breeding role have long been recog-
nized(e.g.West-Eberhard,1967,1978,1981;Strassmann,
1989) and their study continues to be an important area
of research (e.g. Reeve & Nonacs, 1992; Monnin &
Ratnieks, 1999, 2001; Monnin et al., 2002). However,
that the same conﬂict can also occur in species with
morphological castes is a relatively new idea (Ratnieks,
1989, 2001; Bourke & Ratnieks, 1999). Yet, the con-
sequences of caste conﬂict on the functioning of the
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inﬂuence their own caste fate, caste conﬂict is predicted
to lead to more females selﬁshly choosing to develop as
queens than is optimal for colony function (Ratnieks,
2001; Reuter & Keller, 2001; Strassmann et al., 2002).
With more females developing into queens the workforce
is diminished leading to a reduction in total lifetime
colony reproduction (i.e. a smaller colony reproduces
less, survives less or both).
Although caste conﬂict in social Hymenoptera is
expected under a wide range of conditions (Bourke &
Ratnieks, 1999; Ratnieks, 2001; Reuter & Keller, 2001;
Strassmann et al., 2002), in societies with morphologi-
cal castes, it is usually present only in latent or
‘potential’ form (Bourke & Ratnieks, 1999). This is
because in such species, the passive female brood rarely
have the ability to control their own caste fate, as caste
is usually determined by the amount or quality of the
food given to larvae by workers (‘nutritional caste
determination’; Wilson, 1971; Michener, 1974;
Wheeler, 1986). By food control, the adult workers
can coerce immature females to develop as workers.
For example, in honeybees, female larvae develop into
queens only when fed large amounts of special food,
royal jelly, provisioned in special queen cells (Winston,
1987).
However, in one group of highly eusocial insects,
Melipona stingless bees, the caste fate of female brood
can be controlled by the immature female individual
herself (Bourke & Ratnieks, 1999, reviewed by Wen-
seleers & Ratnieks, 2003). This is because Melipona
queens and workers are of the same size and are reared
from identical, mass-provisioned sealed cells (Wilson,
1971; Michener, 1974). These conditions prevent the
adult workers from coercing the immature females and
allow caste to be self-determined – prerequisites for
actual caste conﬂict to be observed. In agreement with
this prediction, Melipona produce a great excess of
queens. Stingless bees reproduce by swarming (Engels
& Imperatriz-Fonseca, 1990). That is, daughter colonies
are founded by queens accompanied by a swarm of
workers. Colonies, therefore, require only few queens to
be reared, just enough to permit seasonal swarming or
supersedure of a failing mother queen. In Melipona,
however, up to 25% of all females are reared as queens,
and most of these are executed by the workers within
hours or days of emergence (Kerr, 1950; Engels &
Imperatriz-Fonseca, 1990; Imperatriz-Fonseca & Zucchi,
1995). Although such queen overproduction has long
been considered paradoxical (Engels & Imperatriz-
Fonseca, 1990), it can now be explained on the basis
of caste conﬂict theory (Ratnieks et al., 2001). In other
stingless bees (Trigonini), queens are normally larger
than workers, and caste is determined by nutrition, as
in the honeybee (Engels & Imperatriz-Fonseca, 1990;
Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2003). In trigonine stingless
bees few queens are reared, in keeping with colony
needs (e.g. in Tetragonisca angustula, only approximately
four queens are reared over an entire season; van Veen
& Sommeijer, 2000).
Although the above observations provide good general
support for caste conﬂict theory, additional, more
detailed, tests would be desirable. However, such tests
require a solid theoretical basis in order to make
predictions about the expected level of excess queen
production. Ratnieks (2001) showed that for swarm-
founding social Hymenoptera, the optimum or ‘evolu-
tionarily stable’ proportion of females that should
develop as queens ranges from 14 to 20% depending
on whether the colony’s males were produced by the
workers or the queen (workers in many species of
eusocial Hymenoptera, including Melipona, retain ovaries
and can lay unfertilized, male, eggs). These predictions
were derived using an allele-frequency model and
although rigorous, this method has several disadvanta-
ges. In particular, it requires evolutionary stable strategy
(ESS) 1 ratios to be derived separately for each colony kin
structure (e.g. single or double mating) which is imprac-
tical for all but the simplest colony structures (e.g. one
queen mated to one or two males).
The aim of this paper is to develop caste conﬂict
theory using inclusive ﬁtness methods (Hamilton, 1964;
Frank, 1998). We develop our model speciﬁcally for
swarm-founding social Hymenoptera, as Melipona, the
prime example where overt caste conﬂict occurs, is
swarm-founding and because it is only in swarm-
founding species that predictions can easily be tested
(Bourke & Ratnieks, 1999). This is because colonies
only need a few queens to swarm, so that excess queen
production is easily quantiﬁed (i.e. all queens are
basically excess). By comparison, in species with queens
that found nests independently the colony optimum
would also be to produce many queens and it would be
hard to determine what fraction of them represents an
excess (i.e. reared in excess of the optimum of the
queen and workers collectively). A major conclusion of
the model is that when caste fate is under larval
control, an excess of queens should occur that is
inversely proportional to intracolonial relatedness. For
simple relatedness structures, we rederive the earlier
results (Ratnieks, 2001). But the new model also makes
more complex social structures, such as extreme poly-
andry (multiple mating by queens) or polygyny (mul-
tiple queens occurring in a single colony) open to
prediction. These additional predictions will allow crit-
ical tests of caste conﬂict theory once more date are
available, and will also suggest key species for data
collection. We also analyse how the colony-level cost of
excess queen production inﬂuences the expected ESS
ratios. Finally, we consider when a transition from
individual to social control over caste fate is expected
(Bourke & Ratnieks, 1999), that is, when workers
should attempt to prevent immature females from
developing as queens.
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Individual caste allocation interests
First we derive the optimal probabilities with which
individual females should develop as queens vs. workers
in swarm-founding social Hymenoptera. We use the
direct-ﬁtness method of Frank (1998), whereby the
direct ﬁtness of various classes of relatives is written as
a function of the individual and average behaviour of
individuals in the group. In our case, this behaviour is the
probability with which females develop as queens. We
use y, z and Z to denote the focal individual, group-
average and population-average probabilities with which
females develop as a queen (Table 1 summarizes the
notation used in this paper). Note that the model
analyses optimal caste allocation (worker vs. queen
production), rather than reproductive (worker vs. sexual,
male + queen) allocation (Pamilo, 1991a; Bourke &
Chan, 1999; Herbers et al., 2001).
It is clear that total colony reproduction, the produc-
tion of males and swarms, is a decreasing function of z.
The more females that develop as queens (higher z), the
fewer that develop as workers, leading to less work and a
lowered ability of the colony to rear males or produce
swarms. For simplicity, and as in the model of Ratnieks
(2001), we initially use a linearly decreasing function,
1 ) z, for the absolute productivity of the focal colony,
but we consider other cost functions later. Relative
colony productivity, i.e. the productivity of the focal
colony relative to a random colony in the population is
then given by G ¼ (1 ) z)/(1 ) Z). We also assume that
queen overproduction reduces male production to the
same extent as swarm production. This assumption is also
relaxed later. Clearly, at the level of the colony, it is
undesirable to have many females develop as queens
(high z). However, at the individual level, there are
distinct beneﬁts associated with becoming a queen rather
than a worker: if females develop as queens with higher
than average probability, it allows them to increase their
chances of inheriting a daughter swarm. Formally, over
the course of a single queen replacement or swarming
event, the relative probability for a female to inherit a
daughter colony is y/z, the ratio of the individual
probability with which it becomes a queen and the
probability with which other females in the colony
become queens.
We can now write the ﬁtness through male (Wm) and
swarm (Wf) production as a function of the individual (y)
and average (z) probabilities with which female larvae
become queens within the colony:
Wm ¼
1   z
1   Z
Wf ¼
y
z
 
1   z
1   Z
ð1Þ
In these equations, (1 ) z)/(1 ) Z) is the relative pro-
ductivity of the colony in terms of male and swarm
production (relative group success G) and (y/z) is the
success of any female larva relative to another (relative
individual success I). In these equations we also assume
that the population is in sex ratio equilibrium, so that the
relative valuation of the sexes is not affected by it. The
above model is closely related to that of Frank (1995b),
which was developed to determine the optimal level of
exploitation within social groups. The only difference is
that we speciﬁcally address the hymenopteran situation
where only females can vary their level of exploitation
(i.e. become queens rather than workers) but costs are to
both sexes.
Whether an increased probability of developing as a
queen is favoured can be calculated from a simple
Hamilton’s rule condition (Hamilton, 1964) with three
affected parties: (1) self, (2) sisters and (3) males. The
personal beneﬁt of developing as a queen is given by
¶Wf/¶y ¼ (1 ) z)/[(1 ) Z)z] (for a full account of the
method used, see Frank, 1998). In other words, the
beneﬁt of becoming a queen is proportional to the
relative productivity of the colony, (1 ) z)/(1 ) Z),
because this sets the ability for the colony to produce
workers and swarms, but is inversely proportional to the
number of competing queens (z), because a female that
develops as a queen will only inherit the colony or
swarm with a probability of 1/z. Similarly, the personal
cost that occurs as a result of other females developing
into queens is given by )¶Wf/¶z ¼ y/[z
2(1 ) Z)]. As the
role of any female in the colony is symmetrical, this is
also the cost of developing as a queen to a sister. Lastly,
Table 1 Parameters and terminology used in this paper.
Wf Fitness through queen (swarm) production
Wm Fitness through male production
G Relative group success (lifetime colony productivity)
I Individual success of one female relative to another
y Probability with which a focal female larva develops into a queen
z Average probability with which female larvae develop into queens
in the colony
Z Population average probability with which female larvae develop
into queens
z
* ESS probability of developing as a queen
k Parameter describing how excess queen production affects total
colony reproduction (swarm and male production) (k ¼ 1/2:
square law, k ¼ 1: linear, k ¼ 2: quadratic, etc.)
ks Parameter describing how excess queen production affects
swarm production (ks ¼ 1/2: square law, ks ¼ 1: linear, ks ¼ 2:
quadratic, etc.)
km Parameter describing how excess queen production affects
male production (km ¼ 1/2: square law, km ¼ 1: linear, km ¼ 2:
quadratic, etc.)
M Effective maternity (number of laying queens)
P Effective paternity
c Cost of preventing excess queen production
Rf Life-for-life relatedness to sister queens reared in the colony
Rm Life-for-life relatedness to males reared in the colony
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(1 ) Z), that is, relative to the population average
productivity of a colony (1 ) Z), a unit change in the
proportion of females that develop into queens causes a
corresponding reduction in the net production of males.
Following kin selection theory (Hamilton, 1964), we
need to weigh these costs and beneﬁts with the related-
ness to the affected parties, that is self (r ¼ 1), sisters
(life-for-life relatedness Rf), and males (life-for-life relat-
edness Rm), to calculate the change in frequency of the
caste determining gene. Summing the three relatedness-
weighted costs and beneﬁts, the net inclusive ﬁtness
beneﬁt of developing as a queen with probability y is
given by
ð1   zÞ
ð1   ZÞz
  1  
y
ð1   ZÞz2   Rf  
1
1   Z
  Rm ð2Þ
Near the ESS, all female larvae will evolve to become
queens with the same probability, so we can set
y ¼ z ¼ Z. Setting the resulting equation to zero and
solving for Z yields the ESS probability with which
female larvae should develop into queens:
z  ¼
1   Rf
1 þ Rm
ð3Þ
In equivalent form, females should develop into queens
or workers in a ratio of
½1   Rf queens  to ½Rf þ Rm workers ð 4Þ
The intuitive explanation is that a female gains from
becoming a queen in proportion to its own value (1)
relative to that of the sisters it is competing with (value
Rf), whereas becoming a worker has indirect beneﬁts in
terms of increased swarm (value Rf) and male production
(value Rm). A similar derivation from a levels-of-selection
perspective is also possible (see Appendix). Note that the
fact that most Melipona queens are killed upon eclosion
(Kerr, 1950; Engels & Imperatriz-Fonseca, 1990;
Imperatriz-Fonseca & Zucchi, 1995) does not make it
less proﬁtable to develop as a queen. This is because if
the queens were allowed to survive this would only
delay the time at which one was ‘chosen’. Or if the
queens could share reproduction this would divide each
queens share of colony reproduction by the number of
queens. Therefore, queen killing does not alter the
expected payoff. Rather, it just converts it from a
small equal payoff to a large jackpot won by one
individual.
Extending the result for nonlinear colony cost func-
tions is straightforward. Instead of using a linear colony-
level cost function, we use a power function (1 ) z)
k (or
any other monotonically decreasing function) for colony
productivity, instead of the linear (1 ) z)
1. This gives a
family of convex (k < 1) and concave (k > 1) curves.
Relative colony productivity G is now equal to (1 ) z)
k/
(1 ) Z)
k and analysis by the same methods as before
yields the ESS
z  ¼
1   Rf
1   Rf þ kðRf þ RmÞ
ð5Þ
This optimum is plotted for different values of k in
Fig. 1a. It is also possible that the costs of excess queen
production to male and swarm production are different,
because they are very different modes of reproduction.
We can generalize the model by describing costs to male
and swarm production with separate power functions
with coefﬁcients km and ks. Fitnesses through male and
swarm production then become
Wm ¼
ð1   zÞ
km
ð1   ZÞ
km
Wf ¼
y
z
 
ð1   zÞ
ks
ð1   ZÞ
ks
ð6Þ
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Fig. 1 ESS probability z
* for a female larva to become a queen in a colony headed by a single once-mated queen, assuming different colony-
level cost functions. The optimum is plotted for cases when all males are either queen (full line) or worker (dashed line) produced. (a)
Queen overproduction reduces male and swarm production equally, and the cost function follows a power law with coefﬁcient k (plotted from
eqn 5). (b) Queen overproduction reduces male and swarm production unequally with costs to swarm and male production following power
laws with coefﬁcients ks and km.
650 T. WENSELEERS ET AL.
J. EVOL. BIOL. 16 (2003) 647–658 ª 2003 BLACKWELL PUBLISHING LTDAnalysis as before yields the ESS
z  ¼
1   Rf
1   Rf þ kfRf þ kmRm
ð7Þ
This optimum is plotted for arbitrary values of ks and km
(Fig. 1b).
From eqns (3)–(5), the prediction is that larvae should
selﬁshly develop as queens with a higher probability
when the relatedness to sister larvae or males or both is
lower (Fig. 2), or when the costs to colony function are
less severe (k < 1, i.e. with a convex colony productivity
function, Fig. 1a).
Table 2 shows some numerical examples for typical
colony kin structures as they occur in Melipona and
honeybees. Most Melipona are headed by a single once-
mated mother queen (Kerr et al., 1962; da Silva et al.,
1972; Kerr, 1975; Contel & Kerr, 1976; Peters et al., 1999;
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Fig. 2 ESS probability z
* for a female larva as a function of the colony kin structure. It is assumed that queen overproduction linearly
reduces total colony reproduction. (a) Optimal levels of queen production when the colony is headed by multiple, once-mated queens. The
ﬁgure is plotted for effective maternities (M) ranging from 1 to 4, assuming that the males are either the queens’ (unbroken line) or the
workers’ sons (dashed line). The bold and ﬁne curves are for when the mother queens are unrelated or related by 0.5. (b) Optimal levels of
queen production when the colony is headed by a single multiple-mated queen. The optimum is plotted for effective paternities (P) ranging
from 1 to 15, with all males either queen (full line) or worker produced (dashed line). The optima are calculated from eqn (3) with relatedness
values Rf ¼ (1 + 2/P + 0.5(M ) 1))/4M and Rm ¼ (1 + 0.5(M ) 1))/4M (all males queen produced) or Rf ¼ Rm ¼ (1 + 2/P + 0.5(M ) 1))/4M
(all males worker produced) (Pamilo, 1991b).
Table 2 Kin structure of various stingless bees and the honeybee Apis mellifera and the individual-optimum probabilities for females to develop
as queens. Lower sister–sister relatedness causes more females to develop as queens while worker production of males has the opposite effect as
the cost of queen overproduction is then borne by closer relatives – workers’ sons (nephews) rather than queens’ sons (brothers). Life-for-life
relatedness to females (Rf) and males (Rm) is the product of regression relatedness (rf, rm) and the sex-speciﬁc reproductive value (the
contribution of a given sex to the future gene pool). The relative reproductive value of males is 1 + p where p is the population proportion of
males that are queens’ sons (Pamilo, 1991b).
Species Kin structure rf ¼ Rf rm
Relative
reproductive
value of
males, vm Rm ¼ rmvm
Optimal
probability for
females to develop
as queens* ¼
(1 ) Rf)/(1 + Rm), % References
Melipona favosa Single once-mated queen, nearly
all males workers’ sons
3/4 3/4 1 3/4 0.14 Sommeijer et al. (1999),
Chinh et al. (2002)
Melipona beecheii Single once-mated queen, nearly
all males queens’ sons
3/4 1/2 1/2 1/4 0.20 Paxton et al. (2001) 
Melipona bicolor Multiple-related queens, most
males probably workers’ sons
0.6 1/2–3/4 1/2–1 1/4–3/4 0.23–0.32 Nogueira-Neto (1970),
da Silva et al. (1972),
da Silva (1977), Bego
(1989), Peters et al.
(1999), D. Koedam
(personal communication)
Apis mellifera Single multiple-mated queen 0.3 1/2 1/2 1/4 0.56 Estoup et al. (1994)
*Assuming that queen overproduction linearly reduces total colony reproduction (eqn 3). The optimum is higher or lower with a convex or
concave productivity function (eqn 5).
 Double mating by queens was erroneously reported for M. beecheii due to the accidental inclusion of workers that drifted between colonies
(Paxton et al., 1999).
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M. bicolor, however, the colony can be headed by one or
several (2–7) related queens, and the average Rf has been
estimated at 0.6 (Peters et al., 1999; Table 2). The
relatedness to the males (Rm) reared in a single-queen
colony can range from 0.25 to 0.75 as a result of variable
degrees of worker reproduction (To ´th et al., 2002). For
example, in M. favosa, nearly all males are workers’ sons,
so that Rm ¼ 0.75, whereas in M. beecheii, all males are
the queens’ sons, so that Rm ¼ 0.25 (Table 2). Assuming
a linear cost function (k ¼ 1), the prediction for Melipona
is that larvae should develop as queens with a probability
of (1 ) 0.75)/(1 + 0.25) ¼ 20% when all males are the
queens’ sons (Rm ¼ 0.25), or with a probability of
(1 ) 0.75)/(1 + 0.75) ¼ 14% when all males are work-
ers’ sons (Rm ¼ 0.75, Table 2). When all males are
workers’ sons the optimum is lower because the cost of
individual selﬁshness then falls on more closely related
males (nephews, Rm ¼ 0.75 rather than brothers,
Rm ¼ 0.25). From a colony-level perspective both of
these values represent great queen overproduction as
only few queens are needed for swarming. These values
agree with those obtained from the exact genetic model
(Ratnieks, 2001), but the current method is more general
as it makes any colony kin structure open to prediction.
For example, in M. bicolor, as a result of polygyny, females
should develop as a queen with even higher probability,
23–32% (Table 2). Similarly, in the honeybee, polyandry
causes very low relatedness among sisters (Rf ¼ 0.3;
Estoup et al., 1994), and the individual optimum is to
develop as a queen with a probability of 56% (Table 2).
Figure 2 shows the optimum for different levels of
polygyny and polyandry.
The numerical predictions above are for the case where
queen overproduction linearly reduces total colony
reproduction (production of males and swarms). The
predictions for other colony-level cost functions are
plotted in Fig. 1. Figure 1a plots the optima when both
male and swarm production are affected in a nonlinear
way. As can be seen, the optimum probability to develop
as a queen is higher when the colony-level cost is less
severe (with a convex colony productivity function,
k < 1, Fig. 1a), or lower when it is more severe (with a
concave colony productivity function, k > 1 (Fig. 1a).
Figure 1b plots the optima when effects of queen
overproduction on male and swarm production differ.
As can be seen, the relative inﬂuence of relatedness is the
same in all cases, but the predicted optima are different,
both in terms of magnitude and range. In other words,
predictions are affected quantitatively but not qualita-
tively [Maynard Smith (2002) comments that biological
systems are generally too complex for precise quantita-
tive predictions, but strong qualitative predictions can be
made]. However, if the cost functions were different for
the different species, then that might obscure the
predicted effect of relatedness. Currently, no information
is available on the shapes of the cost functions. It would
be hard to determine them empirically as a colony
normally only swarms once every few years (Engels &
Imperatriz-Fonseca, 1990) but can produce males over a
long period, even the whole year (Moo-Valle et al.,
2001).
In deriving the optimal level of queen production (eqn
3) we make no assumptions as to how it may be caused at
the proximate level. For Melipona, Kerr (1950) hypothes-
ized a two-locus two-allele genetic system that would
give 25% queens, on average, in each colony. But such a
genetic system, which still lacks strong empirical support
(Velthuis & Sommeijer, 1991), is not strictly required. If it
did occur, however, it might constrain what ratios can be
attained (Ratnieks, 2001). In the model above, we
assumed there are no constraints. Instead, we assumed
a very large number of alleles, each of which could
slightly alter the probability with which females develop
as queens, and with the allele that codes for the optimum
going to ﬁxation.
Worker interests
Immature females beneﬁt from developing as a queen
with a high probability because they value themselves
more highly than their sisters. The adult workers,
however, should value all developing females equally
as they are equally related to all of them (this is
neglecting the possibility of strong nepotism which could
potentially occur under polyandry or polygyny). For-
mally, from the perspective of a worker, the relatedness
to a potential beneﬁciary in eqn (3) is Rf rather than 1,
which yields the optimum z
* @ 0. The caste fate optimum
of the adult workers is thus the same as the colony
optimum of near-zero allocation to queens. By the same
argument, the mother queen also favours the production
of few queens.
A direct consequence of this is that workers (or the
mother queen) should be willing to police larvae that try
to selﬁshly become queens in much the same way as
parents should try to prevent young from being overly
greedy (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Mock & Parker,
1998). As larval manipulation of caste fate brings colony
productivity down from 1 to 1 ) z
* (cf. eqn 1) with
z
* ¼ (1 ) Rf)/(1 + Rm) (eqn 4), workers are expected to
prevent larvae from becoming queens if this can be done
at a lesser cost (c), i.e. when
c <
1   Rf
1 þ Rm
ð8Þ
(The cost of policing is measured as that which would
occur in a colony where all females would become
workers; for a more formal derivation see Wenseleers,
2001.)
From eqn (6), the prediction is that workers should try
to gain social control over larval caste determination
whenever it can be achieved at low cost. This is more
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workers can then withhold food from larvae to hinder
them from developing into a queen (Bourke & Ratnieks,
1999). However, costs, such as accidental starving of
larvae, may be larger in societies of low relatedness, as
policing of larval selﬁshness can then cause greater
potential increases in colony productivity. This parallels
the conclusion of Frank (1995b) that low relatedness is
conducive to the spread of policing although his result,
due to the simpler kin structure modelled, was simply
that policing is favoured when c <1) r. Even in societies
of high relatedness, however, policing may be expected
if it is not too costly. For example, in societies with a
once-mated queen, workers could prevent larvae from
becoming queens if social control had a cost of <20%
(eqn 6).
Empirical support for caste conﬂict theory
Strong general support for the model predictions comes
from the clear association between queen overproduc-
tion and conditions allowing individual control of caste
fate. In Melipona, where queens and workers are reared
from the same cells, there is great queen overproduction:
on average between 5 and 15% of all females usually
develop as queens across different species (e.g. Kerr,
1950; Darchen & Delage-Darchen, 1975; Koedam et al.,
1999; Moo-Valle et al., 2001; Gioli & Bego, 2002; Som-
meijer et al., 2003). Similarly, excess queens develop in
some trigonine stingless bees where females have the
ability to develop as dwarf queens from worker cells – a
situation that has been speciﬁcally likened to Melipona
(Engels & Imperatriz-Fonseca, 1990; Schwarziana quadri-
punctata: production of 25–30 gynes in 10 days, Ribeiro &
Alves, 2001; Plebeia julianii: Juliani, 1962, 1967; Plebeia
remota: production of up to six gynes per month, Ribeiro
et al., 2003). In most species, however, excess queen
production can be effectively prevented by nutritional
control. When queens are larger than workers, develop-
ing females can be forced into a worker role by giving
them insufﬁcient food to allow them to develop as
queens. This is a type of social policing (Ratnieks, 1988),
and could be termed ‘caste fate policing’. Nutritional
caste control can be extremely effective at preventing
excess queen production. Taxa where feeding control is
possible, such as army ants, honeybees and most trigo-
nine stingless bees (with the exception of the genera that
produce dwarf queens), all produce few queens, in
keeping with colony needs. Apis mellifera, for example,
produces about 15–25 queens vs. 150 000 workers over
one season when swarming occurs (Seeley, 1985; Win-
ston, 1987). This implies that the chance for a female to
be reared as a queen is only 0.01–0.02%. Similar ratios
have been observed in the trigonine stingless bee
Tetragonisca angustula (van Veen & Sommeijer, 2000),
where approximately four queens develop over a single
season, amounting to 0.01–0.02% of the female brood.
In army ants, ﬁnally, where queens are 50 times the size
of workers, few queens are generally reared (Aenictus
gracilis: <6, Macevicz, 1979; Dorylus wilverthi: 1–2, Raig-
nier, 1959; Eciton hamatum: 1–14, Schneirla & Brown,
1952; Schneirla, 1971; Franks & Ho ¨lldobler, 1987; the
concurrent worker brood ranges in size from 30 000 to
300 000; Schneirla, 1971). That caste conﬂict is resolved
so efﬁciently is surprising given the huge potential for
conﬂict that is present. As mentioned above, in the
honeybee relatedness is low (Rf ¼ 0.3; Estoup et al.,
1994) because of polyandry and the inclusive ﬁtness
interest of an individual female is to become a queen
with a probability of 56% (assuming a linear cost
function).
In future, more detailed predictions of the theory could
also be tested. For example, it is predicted that fewer
females should selﬁshly develop as queens when all
males are workers’ sons (Table 2). Unfortunately, there
are currently good data on male parentage and caste
ratios for only few species. Therefore, a meaningful test
will be possible only once more data have accumulated.
One species that would be particularly valuable for a
more detailed test is M. bicolor. In this species, the
predicted queen production is higher than in other
Melipona as a result of polygyny, which reduces related-
ness (Table 2). Although no detailed caste ratio data are
available for M. bicolor, da Silva et al. (1972) noted that
bicolor is exceptional within Melipona in that it ‘produces
an unusual [high] quantity of virgin queens’. If M. bicolor
larvae could detect how many laying queens there are in
the colony, they would also beneﬁt by facultatively
adjusting their probability of becoming a queen (Rat-
nieks, 2001). Given that there are other examples of
facultative adjustment of reproduction in social Hymen-
optera, a facultative response seems quite possible (e.g.
Sundstro ¨m et al., 1996; Foster & Ratnieks, 2000). Future
studies could attempt to test this.
Discussion
In this paper, we have investigated a key topic in insect
sociobiology – the conﬂicts associated with the rearing of
individuals of different reproductive and working ability.
More than 20 years ago, Oster & Wilson (1978) noted
that ‘the interaction of individual-level and colony-level
selection complicates the evolution of caste in ways that
are just beginning to be explored’. Indeed, this is exactly
what our current analysis shows. The decision to become
a queen or a worker depends upon an interaction of
individual beneﬁts and costs to the whole colony.
Feeding control of larvae by adults can maximize the
success of the colony by preventing excess numbers of
individuals from selﬁshly developing as queens. For
example, in the honeybee, only 1 in 10 000 females are
reared as queens (Seeley, 1985; Winston, 1987),
although the individual optimum is to become a queen
with a probability of 56%. Clearly, nutritional caste
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suppression, which makes individuals work for the
beneﬁt of society even when this goes against their
inclusive ﬁtness interests. In general terms, our results
reinforce the view that parental or sibling manipulation,
in addition to kin selection, is of major importance in
resolving social conﬂicts (Alexander, 1974, 1987; Mich-
ener & Brothers, 1974; Hamilton, 1975; Leigh, 1977;
Frank, 1995b; Monnin & Ratnieks, 2001; Strassmann
et al., 2002).
If the honeybee illustrates a situation where caste
conﬂict is efﬁciently resolved by social control then
Melipona illustrates the reverse. Weak size differences
between queen and worker and rearing in sealed cells
away from any interference by adults allow every female
larva to control her own fate. In line with predictions,
queens in Melipona are produced in great excess of colony
needs. Excess queen production also occurs in some
trigonine stingless bees where females evade social
control by developing as dwarf queens in worker cells
(Engels & Imperatriz-Fonseca, 1990; Ribeiro et al., 2003).
Signiﬁcantly, excess queen production only occurs in
those trigonines where self-determination is possible.
This represents good and phylogenetically independent
evidence for caste conﬂict theory.
Our inclusive ﬁtness model also makes more detailed
predictions on the expected level of excess queen
production as a function of the colony kin structure.
For single mating, the model recovers the predictions of
Ratnieks (2001) that between 14 and 20% of all females
should develop as a queen depending on male parentage.
But the model also makes several new predictions, for
example, deriving the optima under polygyny (Table 2),
or for nonlinear colony-level cost functions. These
additional predictions will be useful for future tests of
caste conﬂict theory.
Recently, Strassmann et al. (2002) gave evidence for
caste conﬂict in the swarm-founding epiponine wasp
Parachartergus colobopterus. They suggest that in epipo-
nines, caste conﬂict may lead to occasional episodes of
queen overproduction, leading to the colony becoming
polygynous. Parachartergus colobopterus is a species with-
out morphological castes, and who becomes a queen
depends purely on whether females mate and activate
their ovaries (Strassmann et al., 2002). Caste conﬂict in
P. colobopterus is, therefore, over an individual female’s
behavioural rather than morphological caste fate. Con-
sistent with the interpretation of caste conﬂict, queens in
polygynous societies tend to be aggressively suppressed
by the workers (Herman et al., 2000; Strassmann et al.,
2002). Aggression can force queens to work rather than
reproduce, which has the advantage that neither they
nor the other workers have to pay the cost of queen
killing, as in Melipona (Herman et al., 2000; Strassmann
et al., 2002). It is possible, however, that aggressive
suppression does eventually cause a reduction in queen
number, and that it helps to drive the queen number
cycles typical of epiponine wasps (Jeanne, 1991). An
additional observation consistent with occasional queen
overproduction is that polygyny does not increase colony
productivity (Forsyth, 1980). Strassmann et al. (2002)
also developed a model to show why P. colobopterus only
produces excess queens when there is just a single
mother queen left. The conclusion of their model was
that this could be the result of collective worker interests,
which favour the adoption of new queens especially at
low queen number (because they would then replace full
siblings). An alternative that was not discussed, however,
is that females may beneﬁt most from becoming a queen
at low queen number, as they will then have fewer
competitors.
Although our discussion has been primarily concerned
with caste conﬂict in the social Hymenoptera it is worth
considering whether similar conﬂicts occur in the other
major group of social insects, the termites. In particular,
in the ‘lower’ termite families Kalotermitidae and
Termopsidae, overt caste conﬂict might be expected, as
all individuals (except soldiers) are totipotent and can
moult into either a queen or king (Shellman-Reeve,
1997; Thorne, 1997; Myles, 1999). In fact, replacement
reproduction, the process whereby some individuals
moult into a queen or king in case of accidental loss of
the royal pair, seems formally identical to caste conﬂict.
Any individual would beneﬁt from becoming a replace-
ment reproductive, but future colony productivity would
be reduced if an excess do so (for a review, see Myles,
1999). Indeed, removing the royal pair in some species
results in a vast overproduction of replacement repro-
ductives (up to 50%), and the excess are subsequently
killed (Termopsidae: Porotermes adamsoni, Mensa-Bonsu,
1976; Kalotermitidae: Cryptotermes brevis, Lenz et al.,
1985; Kalotermes ﬂavicollis,L u ¨scher, 1952, 1964; Ruppli,
1969; Neotermes connexus, Myles & Chang, 1984; Neotermes
jouteli, Nagin, 1972). This closely resembles the queen
cull in Melipona. Similar conﬂicts also occur at other
evolutionary levels. For example, in slime moulds, the
decision of a cell to become either a reproductive spore or
a sterile stalk cell parallels the decision of a social insect
larva to develop as a queen or a worker (Bourke &
Ratnieks, 1999). As in caste fate conﬂict, conﬂict over
cell-fate is expected especially at low relatedness, which
can arise as a result of the mixing of different clones
during fruiting body formation (Hudson et al., 2002).
Indeed, chimaerism appears common in nature (Strass-
mann et al., 2000), and there is some evidence that actual
conﬂict does occur (Atzmony et al., 1997; Csaba & Bala ´zs,
2000). This shows how the concept of caste conﬂict will
probably help towards the understanding of a wide
variety of social conﬂicts.
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Appendix. Caste conﬂict from a levels-of-
selection perspective
Caste conﬂict is expected because females are more
highly related to own offspring than to a sister’s
offspring. Alternatively, one could say that females
beneﬁt from developing as queens because this increa-
ses their reproductive success relative to other females
within the colony, although this might reduce the total
reproduction of the group. This leads to an equivalent
interpretation of caste conﬂict as a levels-of-selection
problem, which can be analysed using the multilevel
Price equation (Price, 1972; Frank, 1995a). For struc-
tured populations (e.g. individuals structured into
groups), Price (1972) showed that selection may be
partitioned into two components, one due to the
differential success of individuals within groups, and
the other due to the differential success of groups.
Price’s (1972) equation for gene frequency change,
in simple form, ignoring mutation and drift, is
bGzVB + bwyVW, where bGz is the effect of the average
level of selﬁshness on group productivity (i.e. the group
cost), bwy is the effect of the individual level of
selﬁshness on individual ﬁtness (i.e. the individual
beneﬁt) and the VB and VW are between- and within-
group genetic variances, respectively, which give appro-
priate weightings to the group and the individual as
units-of-selection. Hamilton (1975) showed that when
groups are large, the between-group genetic variance is
proportional to relatedness, and the within-group gen-
etic variance is proportional to 1-relatedness. The Price
equation, therefore, both resolves the kin vs. group
selection controversy and offers a precise answer to the
dilemma of what really is the unit of selection (Brandon
& Burian, 1984; Gliddon & Gouyon, 1989; Maynard
Smith, 1998): groups can be considered units of selection
in proportion to intragroup relatedness while individuals
are units of selection in proportion to 1-relatedness.
When groups are clones, natural selection simply strives
for maximal group success and for maximal intragroup
altruism. On the other hand, when groups are composed
of unrelated individuals, natural selection favours high
within-group selﬁshness, leading to lowered group
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tional to 1 ) rf, but the between-group variance has two
components, one for the genetic variation present in
females, rf, and one for the genetic variation present in
males, rm (rm does not feature in the within-group
selection component as males do not actually express
the caste determination phenotype. Therefore, no within-
colony selection can act on them. However, between-
colony selection does occur, as males contain copies of the
caste determination gene, and fewer of these will be
passed on if the colony productivity is reduced.) The
individual beneﬁt bwy is ¶Wf/¶¼ [(1 ) z)/(1 ) Z)](y/z), i.e.
(1 ) z)/[(1 ) Z)Æz]; the group cost bGz is )1/(1 ) Z)a s
G ¼ (1 ) z)/(1 ) Z) and ¶G/¶z ¼ )1/(1 ) Z). Equilibrium
occurs when components of selection, weighted by
reproductive value, balance each other:
ð1   zÞ
ð1   ZÞz
  VW ¼
1
1   Z
  VB ð9Þ
with VB ¼ Rf + Rm and VW ¼ 1 ) Rf. This equilibrium
condition is exactly the same as that derived using the
kin selection approach (eqn 2). The only difference is that
the logic and calculation to arrive at the result were
different. This reinforces the view that kin and group
selection are merely two different ways of analysing gene
frequency change (e.g. Hamilton, 1975; Wade, 1980;
Wilson, 1983; Queller, 1992; Dugatkin & Reeve, 1994;
Keller, 1999).
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